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1. When Dieter Grimm, then-Justice of the German Constitutional Court, received
death threats, had bodyguards watching after him and bulletproof window glasses
installed in his home in Karlsruhe – after a highly controversial chamber ruling on
free speech, leading to the “soldiers are murderers” decision of court’s first senate
in 1995 – he was asked in an interview about those menacing circumstances. He
answered (I’m paraphrasing here) that this was not worth mentioning at all, that
judges in other countries had to face real threats whereas he was working in a
functioning constitutional democracy.
Leaving our panel of the workshop on Constitutional Resilience, I was reminded of
this  interview, since I left with the highest esteem for those lawyers, scholars and
members of organisations of civil society who reported on the situation in Poland and
Hungary – and who are fighting against threats to human rights and constitutional
democracy compared to which, at least many German casebook cases, seem eerily
harmless.
2. Our panel covered three interrelated topics: Freedom of Speech, Media and Civil
Society. We heard about and discussed massive and flagrant violations of central
commands of the fundamental rights of communication, especially of the prohibition
of political viewpoint discrimination. We heard about and discussed, that is, an
assault on the central values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights,
on which the European Union claims to be founded upon (Art. 2 TEU). In this short
post I can of course not do justice here to the six excellent presentations we heard
and discussed. As was frequently remarked, Hungary is further down the road to
an authoritarian regime than Poland. Still, the reports from both countries should be
quite shocking for anybody not already familiar with those developments.
3. In Poland, in 2015 and 2016 the ruling majority (of PiS) enacted laws that ensured
government control over public media. The National Media Council was installed for
that purpose. A judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court from 2016, declaring this
Media Council unconstitutional, has not been enforced. More than 200 journalists
were dismissed from public radio and television for political reasons. Although some
of them have successfully sued, the systemic effects and the chilling effects of such
a purge remain.
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One can hardly think of clearer violations of the freedom of speech principles of
the European Convention on Human Rights as laid down by the Strasbourg Court
in its Manole Judgement of 2009 on Moldavia, §§ 95-102, esp. § 98: “A situation
whereby a powerful economic or political group in a society is permitted to obtain
a position of dominance over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure
on broadcasters and eventually curtail their editorial freedom undermines the
fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society as enshrined in
Article 10 of the Convention […]. This is true also where the position of dominance is
held by a State or public broadcaster.”
As Dieter Grimm stressed when visiting our panel, the public broadcasting
systems of Poland (and Hungary can therefore also not be compared with public
broadcasting as it is envisioned by the case law of the German Constitutional Court
from its Deutschlandfernsehen judgement of 1961 (BVerfGE 12, 205) to the ZDF
judgement of 2014 (in English here), under which public broadcasters have to
retain a measured distance and independence from government control (“Gebot der
Staatsferne”).
Perhaps the German constitution could be made more resilient if those principles
of media pluralism (cf. Article 11 sec. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and
of independence of public broadcasters from government control were explicitly
constitutionalized in Art. 5 GG?
Other examples of egregious violations of freedom of speech in Poland include
judges that were disciplinary sanctioned for teaching about the constitution,
demonstrators that were sanctioned for shouting slogans during a demonstration
(because shouting allegedly violated the public order), journalists whose access to
courts was restricted and against whom civil defamation proceedings were initiated
for allegedly insulting state officials or the “dignity of the Polish people” (by critically
discussing the Polish relationship to the Holocaust).
Civil society is under massive attack in Poland as well. NGOs critical of the
Government have been defunded or had their funds frozen – also raising serious
free speech concerns under the prohibitions of political content discrimination
and viewpoint discrimination. Those are principles on which the case law of the
Strasbourg Court could be clearer but which have been clearly articulated by the
German Constitutional Court (cf. especially BVerfGE 124, 300 – Wunsiedel [2009];
English translation here; §§ 30 et seq.; see for the prohibition of specials laws
[“Sonderrecht”] against certain opinions as such also [in German] also here, p.
74-75, 114 et seq. [with a comparison between ECHR, U.S. Supreme Court and
the German Constitutional Court]; see also [behind paywalls] here, Rn. 145-148;
Grabenwarter, Art. 5 [2013], §§ 121-127; Schemmer, Art. 5 Rn. 99.1-99.4).
The European Court of Human Rights, although it has yet to develop an explicit
doctrine of viewpoint discrimination, has at least rightly stressed that “it would
be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of
Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted
by the majority”: “Were this so, a minority group’s rights to freedom of religion,
expression and assembly would become merely theoretical rather than practical
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and effective as required by the Convention […]” (ECHR, Alekseyev v. Russia, 21
October 2010, No. 4916/07 et. al., § 81).
A state strikes at the heart of the freedom of speech if it aims at restricting certain
political opinions or viewpoints as such, instead of protecting legal interests without
regard to a specific opinion (cf. the Wunsiedel judgement, §§ 31-33, 49-52, 54). The
prohibition of political viewpoint discrimination might therefore be another candidate
for a codification that could strengthen the resilience of the German and European
human rights system.
4. This impression is enforced if we turn to Hungary. The reports in our panel
confirmed the diagnosis, that the Hungarian Government is merely pretending to
play by the rules of a constitutional democracy.
Backed, in contrast to Poland, by constitutional amendments, the autocratic forces
come closer to their explicit goal of creating an “illiberal state” (see this speech from
2014). To that end they follow a strategy of “rule by law” (see, e.g. Renáta Uitz,
here), using legality as a means, targeting institution after institution and dismantling
the rule of law “one step at a time” (see Miles R. Mafteanon, here, on the latest case
of the Central European University; cf. also Cas Mudde, here).
The Hungarian government ensured its control over all media by installing the
Hungarian Media Council in 2010. Moreover, it systematically undermined media
pluralism by using state funds to foster media outlets which are loyal to the
Government, especially by purchasing advertising time mainly from those outlets.
Private companies are nudged by favorable regulatory treatment to do the same.  A
shrinking group of independent media outlets is retained as a mere fig leaf (see also
this recent piece in the New York Times on the systematic takeover of news outlets).
New media, for example Facebook, is also part of such strategies (in Hungary as
well as in Poland) which are designed to systematically privilege (or damage) only
specific political viewpoints as such.
An especially glaring further example of such political viewpoint discrimination is
a law from this summer that levies a 25 percent tax on organisations that “support
migration” by activities such as “carrying out and participating in media campaigns”,
“educational activities” or “propaganda activity that portrays immigration in a positive
light”. The law has been challenged at the ECHR. The Venice Commission is
expected to issue an opinion this month.
5. Wolfgang Merkel advised us in the opening plenary session from an analytical,
comparative perspective to relax a bit and realize, that these might be typical
adjustment problems for the comparatively young eastern constitutional
democracies. On the other hand, he also rightly stressed that, from a normative
perspective, we should not yield the least bit from our commitment to constitutional
democracy.
And indeed, as far as the threats to freedom of speech, media and civil society
are concerned, it was forcefully demonstrated in our panel, that, from a normative
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perspective, the problems of Hungary and Poland are decidedly not external to
western democracies.
No, the illness or health of the patient and its constitutional resilience have to be
considered for the political body of the European Union as a whole. Since the
problems of Hungary and Poland are internal problems of the Union, if they are
resolved or not will be decisive for the future identity of this Union – for the normative
aspirations that we, as European citizens, can credibly profess to believe in.
Freedom of speech, media freedom and the freedom of civil society are the lifeblood
of democracy. If their destruction in Hungary and Poland continues at this pace, we
all will, as Europeans, have failed the democratic idea. So, for a Union of democratic
values, this is no time to relax at all. On the contrary, it is high time to sound the
alarm bells as loud as we can – if we have not, like some (see Steinbeis, e.g., here,
here, here, here here, here  here, here or here), already been sounding them for
years.
- 4 -
